SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN & ARNOLD LLP 1 SCOTT D. MROZ Bar No. 111848 BRETT H. BAILEY Bar No. 156011 2 One Embarcadero Center, 16th Floor San Francisco, California 94111-3628 3 Telephone: (415) 781-7900 Facsimile: (415) 781-2635 4 Attorneys for Petitioner 5 **Beckman Capital Corporation** 6 7 8 BEFORE THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD 10 11 In re petition of PETITION NO: 12 BECKMAN CAPITAL CORPORATION'S Beckman Capital Corporation, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 13 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF Petitioner PETITION FOR REVIEW OF REGIONAL 14 WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD ORDER NO. R5-2004-0043 15 16 17 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CRITICAL FACTS 18 I. On April 22, 2004, the Regional Water Quality Control Board, Central Valley Region 19 (Regional Water Board) issued Cleanup and Abatement Order No. R5-2004-0043 (Order), 20 concerning tetrachloroethene (PCE) contamination in the City of Lodi, California.1 The Order 21

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¹ The Order is attached to Beckman Capital Corporation's Petition for Review as Exhibit A.

names Beckman Capital Corporation (Beckman) as a discharger, on the grounds that Beckman

contaminated with PCE.2 At no time did Beckman ever use PCE on its Property or within the

owns property at 212 West Pine Street in the City of Lodi (the Property), which currently is

² Exhibit A, paragraph 6.

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SEDGWICK 28
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City of Lodi, let alone discharge or release PCE into the environment.³ No evidence that Beckman caused any discharge of PCE was presented to the Board, and the only testimony on the subject clearly states to the contrary.⁴ Accordingly, the Regional Water Board did not find that Beckman itself discharged PCE at its Property or elsewhere, and instead named Beckman as a discharger solely based on its status as the owner of a contaminated property.⁵

In contrast, the Regional Water Board determined that activities by Guild Cleaners, Inc. (Guild), the Estate of Dwight Alquist (Estate), the City of Lodi (City), and the Lodi News Sentinel (Lodi News), caused the PCE contamination in the area, including on Beckman's Property. In other words, the Regional Water Board found, implicitly if not explicitly, that Beckman's Property had been contaminated entirely by others. Accordingly, the Regional Board named Guild, the Estate, the City, and the Lodi News as dischargers under the Order, each liable for responding to its requirements.

The record further indicates that of these parties, Guild is submitting Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study to the Regional Water Board for the Central Plume Area, has already conducted a remedial investigation, including three pilot tests for remedial technologies, and otherwise has performed what Regional Board staff concedes is "significant" work to date.⁸ In addition, the City has conducted investigations into the extent of the contamination in the area,

³ See Exhibit A, paragraphs 1-6. See also Exhibit D to Beckman's Petition, the transcript of the April 22, 2004 Regional Water Board hearing on the Order, pp. 11-12, 56-58.

⁴ See Exhibit D generally, and in particular pp. 56-58. No one, including Board staff, submitted any evidence indicating that Beckman itself used or caused PCE to discharge into the environment. No such evidence exists, since Beckman is simply an investment company that bought the Property in 1968, and its tenants used the building for general office purposes. See Exhibit D, pp. 56-58; see also the letter from Scott Malm to Antonia Vorster, dated April 16, 2004, which the Board accepted as part of the record for its decision. A true and correct copy of that letter is attached to the Petition as Exhibit H. The letter details the history of Beckman's ownership and the fact that no PCE was used by Beckman or any of its tenants at the Property. The letter also notes, in particular, that Beckman had no involvement in, or control over, the Lodi News-Sentinel operations that preceded Beckman's occupancy of the Property. Rather, Beckman purchased the Property in 1968 subject to the condition that it not take possession until the Lodi News Sentinel vacated the Property, which it did several months after title was transferred to Beckman.

⁵ See Exhibit A, ¶ 6; see also Exhibit D, pp. 11-12.

⁶ See Exhibit A, ¶¶ 1-5; see also Exhibit D, pp. 8-13.]

⁷ See Exhibit A.

⁸ See Exhibit D, hearing transcript, pp. 13-16, 19; see also Exhibit A, ¶ 11.

SEDGWICK 28

has acted to prevent its sewer lines from further spreading the contamination, and has clearly expressed to the Regional Water Board its intent to pursue investigation and clean up in cooperation with the Board and other parties.

Despite the fact that Beckman has been victimized as much as any one by the contamination, and was not responsible for it escaping into the environment in the first place, Beckman did not dispute the Regional Water Board's authority to name Beckman as a discharger in the Order based on its status as an owner of contaminated property. However, Beckman did argue that under these circumstances, it should be named as a secondarily liable party. That request was summarily denied by the Regional Water Board, which instead chose to place the same burden on Beckman as on those actually responsible for the contamination.

II. CONCISE STATEMENT OF CONTENTION

Beckman contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the Regional Water Board to deny its request to be named a secondarily liable party where the evidence in the record shows that: (1) Beckman itself neither participated in any discharges of PCE into the environment nor had involvement in or control over the operations that caused the contamination; (2) Beckman's status as the owner of property contaminated by others, and nothing else, is what makes it subject to an order under California Water Code §13304; and (3) other parties whose activities actually caused the contamination continue to exist and some of them have already begun participating in the investigation and cleanup in the area covered by the Order. Failure to name Beckman as a secondarily liable party under these circumstances is inconsistent with the Orders of the State Water Board, inconsistent with the manner in which other Regional Water Boards treat parties situated similarly to Beckman, and inconsistent with State Water Board enforcement policy, and consequently is abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, Beckman respectfully requests that the State Water Board invalidate the portion of the Order naming Beckman as a primarily responsible party, and require the Regional Water Board to instead name Beckman as a secondarily responsible party.

⁹ See Exhibit A, ¶¶ 10, 12; see also Exhibit D, pp. 27-33.

¹⁰ See Exhibit D, pp. 56-58.

SEDGWICK 28

III. POINTS OF ERROR BY THE REGIONAL WATER BOARD

A. <u>Failure to Designate Beckman as Secondarily Liable Is Inconsistent With Prior</u> Orders of The State Water Board

 The Availability of Secondary Liability For An Owner Turns Primarily on Lack of Involvement in Causing the Pollution and the Presence of Other Dischargers Making Progress Towards Cleanup.

In <u>Aluminum Company of America</u>, Order No. WQ 93-9, the State Water Board concisely summed up the factors which should lead to holding a party secondarily liable in a Cleanup and Abatement Order. Those factors are "whether or not the party initiated or contributed to the discharge; and whether those parties who created or contributed to the discharge are proceeding with cleanup." Order No. WQ 93-9, p. 16, ftn 8 (1993) (citing, among others, <u>Arthur Spitzer</u>, Order No. 89-8 (1989)). Other decisions affirm that secondary liability is appropriate for current landowners if they "neither caused nor permitted the activity which led to the discharge." <u>Wenwest, Inc.</u>, et al, Order No. WQ 92-13, p. 9-10 (1992).

The facts in <u>Spitzer</u> (Order No. W.Q. 89-8), while somewhat complicated, are instructive of the principles indicating when secondary liability is appropriate. The owners of the property at issue gave a long term ground lease to T&F, Inc., which in turn sublet the property, over time, to various dry cleaning operations. Subsequently, the owners and T&F negotiated a new ground lease with another party, L.A. Land, which gave L.A. Land exclusive possession and control of the property for 45 years. L.A. Land also received an assignment of all sub-leases. The ground lease required L.A. Land to maintain the property in compliance with environmental laws, and gave the owners a right of reversion if it failed to do so.

Shortly after signing the ground lease, L.A. Land terminated the dry cleaning operations on the property. During subsequent redevelopment significant PCE contamination was discovered in the soil and groundwater on the Property. The Regional Water Quality Control Board, Santa Ana Region, named all of the owners, T&F, and the various dry cleaning operators as dischargers in a Cleanup and Abatement Order. It chose not to name L.A. Land as a discharger.

SEDGWICK 2

Upon petition for review of that order, the State Water Board added L.A. Land as a discharger. The State Board found that "even though L.A. Land is not the fee owner, it did acquire exclusive possession and control of the property. . . ." and that "during the 45 year term of its lease, L.A. land has the same ability to control the continuing discharge on the Property as it would have if it had fee title." <u>Id.</u> at p.6. Importantly, the State Water Board stated:

"Although L.A. Land should be named as a discharger in the Orders, it should have the same status as the Owners. It should be required to take responsibility for the cleanup only if the other dischargers fail to perform. This would be the equitable conclusion, because L.A. Land had no connection with the activities which initially caused the pollution, the parties directly responsible for the PCE release have been identified and are making some progress towards cleanup, and while L.A. Land has possession and control for a very long time, it shares that control with the owners, who have reversionary rights to the Property." Id. at p.7 (emphasis added)

In short, the seminal factors in applying secondary responsibility are (1) whether the discharger had no connection to the activities which caused the pollution; and (2) whether other parties directly responsible for the pollution are making some progress towards cleanup. It is critical to note that possession and control of the property, with concomitant ability to address the ongoing migration of contaminants in the soil and groundwater, is grounds for being named a discharger, but did not disqualify either L.A. Land (the current possessor) or the Owners (a reversionary right to control) from being given secondarily liable status. It is also important to note the State Water Board's consideration of equity in determining secondary liability.

The order issued by the State Water Board in Wenwest, Inc., Order No. W.Q. 92-13 (1992), confirms these principles. There, both the landowner and the current tenant, which had long term possession and control of the property, were named as dischargers by the Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Francisco Bay Region. Neither of those parties had caused or contributed to the contamination, which resulted from the operations of prior tenants that were also named in the order. However, the Regional Board chose not to give the owner, Susan Rose, or the current tenant, Wenwest, secondarily liable status.

The State Water Board corrected that determination, and required that both the tenant in control, and the owner, be named as secondarily liable dischargers, responsible for carrying out the order only if the other dischargers failed to do so. <u>Id.</u> at p.2. The State Board noted that

SEDGWICK 28

Wenwest "exercises all the normal attributes of day to day ownership of the property" and that it "had nothing to do with the activity which caused the discharge." <u>Id.</u> at p.4. However, it concluded "we see no reason to treat Wenwest any differently from Susan Rose," and designated both of them as secondarily responsible parties.

2. The Regional Water Board Fundamentally Misapplied the Standard For Secondary Liability in Beckman's Case.

The Regional Water Board never meaningfully addressed the factors identified above in considering Beckman's request, instead applying an erroneous misinterpretation of the principles at issue. During the hearing, the Board inquired about when secondary liability should be applied. Staff counsel indicated the following:

"And the circumstances that they have [applied secondary liability] are generally, for example, a site where the owner leased a long term lease to somebody and was never really involved in the operation of the property, and that owner may be considered secondarily liable because they didn't do the actual operation and they weren't participating in the property, but it is a very unique circumstance that you would set up that kind of situation."

That statement unequivocally mischaracterizes the standard, purpose and intent of secondary liability as described in State Board orders. Those orders do not indicate that secondary liability is reserved for owners who have given long term leases and are "never really involved in the operation of the property" or who "weren't participating in the property." L.A. Land, which was given secondary liability, clearly was "participating in the property" and "involved in the operation" of the property, inasmuch as it was redeveloping it. Further, the owner in Spitzer had a reversionary interest that permitted some control of the property. Similarly, Wenwest was operating its franchise on the property. All of those parties were designated as secondarily liable, because the operative principle is lack of participation in the contaminating activity—not a complete lack of possession or control of the property, as board members were led to believe.

The only other discussion of the standard for applying secondary liability occurred during

¹¹ See Exhibit D, pp. 39-40.

SEDGWICK ARNOLDER

closing comments by staff. Members of the Regional Board inquired regarding staff's position on secondary liability. In response, staff stated: "these dischargers who are requesting secondary liability status don't fit within the requirements the State Board established for secondarily liable parties." That comment was based on "the reasons [staff counsel] discussed," (i.e. the long-term lease comment quoted above), and on comments (made out of order) which indicated length of ownership of the property, or current control over property with significant concentrations of contamination, somehow disqualified a party from secondary liability.¹³

As is noted in the discussion above, control over a contaminated property, with concomitant ability to remove source soils and address continued migration of contaminants, is not a disqualifying factor with respect to being given secondary liability status. Moreover, length of ownership is not considered as an important factor, if it is considered at all, by State Water Board orders. In fact, other Regional Boards have given secondary liability status to owners that did not themselves pollute, and who owned their properties as long as Beckman has owned the Property here.¹⁴

In short, the Regional Water Board fundamentally misapplied State Water Board precedent and principles when considering Beckman's contention that it should be secondarily liable under the Order, and consequently has abused its discretion. Further, as is discussed below, under the facts present here and the principles outlined in section A.1 above, Beckman should have been designated as a secondarily liable party.

3. The Facts Here Justify Designating Beckman as a Secondarily Liable Party, and It Was An Abuse of Discretion For the Regional Board Not To Do So.

The evidence presented and available to the Regional Water Board makes clear that there

¹² Exhibit D, pp. 65-66.

¹³ <u>Id.</u> at pp. 58, 65-66.

¹⁴ See Exhibit E to Beckman's petition, Order No. 00-112, issued by the Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Francisco Bay Region. There, an owner that purchased his property in 1971, and who did not itself pollute, subsequently was named as a discharger when it was discovered that the prior owner had polluted the property. The current owner was given secondary liability status in that order, notwithstanding the length of time it had owned the property.

SEDGWICK 28

Wenwest, and Beckman. First, Beckman did not "initiate or contribute to the discharge." All of the testimony and evidence before the Regional Water Board indicates that Beckman itself did not participate in or control any activity that caused PCE to be released into the environment, and demonstrates that Beckman's property was contaminated through the activities of others.

Beckman's status as the owner of contaminated property, and nothing else, is what makes it subject to an order under California Water Code §13304.

Second, the parties directly responsible for the PCE release have been identified and there was ample evidence before the Regional Water Board that they are making some progress towards cleanup. As noted above, one active discharger, Guild, has submitted an Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study work plan, has conducted remedial investigation work, including three pilot tests for remedial technologies, and otherwise has performed what Board staff conceded to be "significant" work to date. Likewise, the City has conducted investigations into the extent of the contamination in the area, has acted to prevent its sewer lines from further spreading the contamination, and has clearly expressed to the Regional Water Board its intent to pursue investigation and clean up in cooperation with the Board and other parties. ¹⁶

Third, where polluting parties are available to address the contamination, it is not equitable to place on Beckman the heavy burden of having to respond to the Regional Water Board Order in the first instance. Secondary liability is equitable and strikes the right balance, in that Beckman is not given the same initial burden as the actual polluters, but remains named in the order and available to address its obligations if the polluting parties prove unable to do so.

Under these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for the Regional Water Board to refuse Beckman's request to be designated secondarily liable under the Order, and Beckman respectfully requests that the State Water Board correct that error by designating Beckman a secondarily liable party.

¹⁵ See Exhibit D, hearing transcript, pp. 13-16, 19; see also Exhibit A, ¶ 11.

¹⁶ See Exhibit A, ¶¶ 10, 12; see also Exhibit D, pp. 27-33.

SEDGWICK -

B. Other Regional Water Boards Have Designated Parties Similarly Situated to Beckman as Secondarily Liable, and the Failure to Treat Beckman in the Same Manner Violates State Water Board Policy and Is Arbitrary and Capricious.

Numerous other Regional Board orders have granted secondarily liable status to parties similarly situated to Beckman. See, e.g. Exhibit E (property owner that did not pollute property but who had current possession and ability to control designated secondarily liable); Exhibit F (Trust that owned the property during a time of discharge, but did not itself cause the pollution, and which continued to own the property at the time of the order, designated as secondarily liable); and Exhibit G (Vallco, the owner of the property during a time of discharge, and the current owner, which had no connection to the polluting activity, but which currently had control and possession of the site, both designated as secondarily liable dischargers). Beckman should be treated in the same way.

Adopted policy of the State Water Board is for the Regional Boards to "strive to be fair, firm and consistent in taking enforcement actions throughout the State" and to "apply similar requirements to similar situations." [.] The Regional Water Board Order naming Beckman as a primarily liable party violates these principles.

First, it is not fair, in that it treats property owners having no connection to the pollution (other than the fact of owning a property polluted by others), as equally culpable with those that caused the pollution in the first place. It also places equal cleanup burdens on both, despite ample evidence and basis to distinguish between the two.

Second, it is not consistent and does not constitute "applying similar requirements in similar situations" when other parties, similarly situated, are named as secondarily liable parties by other Regional Water Quality Control Boards, but Beckman is not. There is no meaningful distinction between Beckman and those other parties, yet if the Regional Water Board Order is allowed to stand as it exists, Beckman will be responsible, in the first instance, for meeting the requirements of a CAO, while those other parties are not.

¹⁷ See State Water Resources Control Board Resolution no. 2002-0040 (Water Quality Enforcement Policy), pp. 1-2.

In short, the Regional Water Board decision naming Beckman as primarily liable is inconsistent with the adopted policy of the State Water Board, as well as the orders of other Regional Water Quality Control Boards, and therefore is arbitrary and capricious.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Beckman respectfully requests that the State Water Board: (1) stay the Order as to Beckman; (2) invalidate the portion of the Order naming Beckman as a primarily responsible party; and (3) require the Regional Water Board to instead name Beckman as a secondarily responsible party.

DATED: May 21, 2004

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SEDGWICK 28